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METHODS OF MAKING GIFTS OF LAND FOR
CHARITABLE OR PUBLIC USES
J. W. SIMONTON

In 1869 the then owners of a large acreage of land,
granted one acre in the midst thereof to a certain township, "to be exclusively appropriated and used as a site for
a schoolhouse and school for said township." In 1923 the
land being within proved gas territory, the Board of Education, claiming to be successors in title to the grantee,
madq an oil and gas lease of the acre, and the assignee of
the lessee prepared to drill. The owners of the adjoining
lands, who were successors in title of the grantors, sought to
enjoin drilling and a temporary injunction was entered below, which on appeal was made permanent.'
The court decided that the language quoted above, indicated the intent of the grantors to restrict the use of the
land, and was not merely a statement of the purposes of the
conveyance; that such language amounted to a restrictive
covenant limiting the grantee's use of the land which should
be enforced as such by injunction. Doubtless a majority
of lawyers would agree that the language in question does
indicate an intent to restrict the use of the land to school
purposes, and if so, then the court's decision that such
language, though not expressly stated in the form of a
covenant or agreement, may be construed as a restrictive
4 United Fuel Co. v. Morley Oil & Gas Co., 93 W.,Va. 18, 185 S. E. 899 (1926).
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covenant, is supported by the authorities.2 When such a
restrictive covenant benefits the adjoining lands owned by
the grantors at the time of the conveyance it may be
enforced by the successors in title.3 Clearly the bulk of the
gas obtainable through a well drilled on the acre in question would be drained from the adjoining lands, even though
the usual offset wells were drilled, and furthermore the
drilling of several offset wells would be necessary to give
the partial protection possible against this one well. Consequently the result of the decision is one with which one
may well feel satisfied: 4
The language of the granting portion of the deed does
not appear in the opinion, but one would infer that the
conveyance was of the acre in fee simple, followed by the
language quoted above, thus giving the grantee a fee with
a restriction which enables the grantors and their successors in title to enforce the limited use in accordance with
familiar equitable principles applicable to such restrictions.
While the court of equity always exercises a certain discretion in the enforcement of equitable servitudes, there is no
reason to suppose it would not enforce the present one so
long as the land is used by the grantee and assigns for
school purposes. But the school authorities may decide at
some time in the future, that the public interest requires the
abandonment of the use of this acre for school purposes.
The court will not at the request of the adjoining owners,
compel the continued maintenance of the use by the school
authorities, when such use is contrary to public interest.
In such case what would be done with the acre of land?
Presumably, it would belong to the township in fee, and the
township could then treat it as any other tract of land
owned by it in fee. It could probably convey an indefeasible title. In other words, while the restrictive cove2 Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876) ; Parker v. Nightengale, 6 Allen (Mass.)
841 (1863).
See Giddings, "Restrictions on the Use of Land," 5 HAnv. L. REV. 174,
117; Clark, "Equitable Servitudes," 16 MICH. L. REV. 9D, 99. Such constructions have
usually been made where the conveyance was by way of gift. Whether the conveyance
was by way of gift in the principal case does not appear. There was a consideration of ten
dollars recited in the deed, but whether it had ever been paid or whether it was an
adequate price for the acre of land does not appear.
. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1295; Clark, "Equitable Servitudes," 16 Mici.
L. REV. 90, 94.
1 If this was a gift to the township for school purposes only, It seems a violation
of moral principles for the donee to thus proceed to drain the gas from the adjoining
lands which at the time of the gift belonged to the donors.
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nant attached to a grant in fee simple as in this case, gives
reasonable protection to the adjoining lands, so long as the
use for school purposes is not abandoned this device fails
in case of abandonment of use."
Doubtless in the future, as in the past, there will occasionally be a man desirous of making a gift of land for
some public or charitable purpose with some sort of restriction or provision to assure the continued use of the land
donated for the specified purpose. Such a would-be donor
is apt to be somewhat hazy as to his exact intent, but in
many cases, if not ii; a majority of cases, he would like to
ma'ke the gift of land in such a way as to insure, so far as
legally possible, the use of that particular land for the
designated purpose.6 If such would-be grantor were informed by his lawyer that the designated use might be
abandoned at sonie future time by the grantee he would
often desire that in such event the title of the land revest
in himself, his heirs or assigns. As every competent lawyer knows, to make a conveyance which will reasonably
and satisfactorily effectuate such intent is by no means easy
under our law. Let us then assume a would-be donor who
desires to make a gift for some public or charitable purpose
in such a way as will give the donee the full and effectual
use of the land for the designated purposes, but under
which the donee can be restricted to an exclusive use while
the specified use is continued and if such use should be
abandoned, that the title would pass to the grantor, to his
heirs or to his assigns as the case may be. To accomplish
this some interest must remain in the grantor which he can
alienate, and which will so take effect as to draw to it the
full ownership of the land on abandonment of the use. What
method should be adopted which will best effectuate this

intent of the donor?
A conveyance in fee as in the principal case with a re5

Unless the court should construe the language quoted as constituting a condition
as well as a covenant, the title of the township would become absolute on proper abandonment of the use for school purposes. It seems doubtful whether the court could
construe -this language both as a covenant and as a condition. See 18 0. T. 871.
$Usually at the time of the gift the donor is interested In having the school or
Dark or other institution maintained at that particular location, and expects it to be
established and to continue at least for a very long period. Unless suggested to him
he Is not likely to consider that the authorities may be able to abandon the use of the
premises, and consequently his interest in providing a way. by which the land may be
recovered by himself, his heirs or assigns will be aroused only on making this possibility
clear to him.
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strictive covenant, limiting the use by the grantee to the
particular purpose designated is effective so long as the
grantee continues to use the premises for the designated
purpose, but it does not cover the case of abandonment of
the use. Hence the method used in the principal case will
not be discussed as one of the possible methods, but in some
of the situations the restrictive covenant may advantageously be used in connection with or as an addition to some
other device.
The following methods of effectuating the donor's intent
may be mentioned: (1) A determinable fee; (2) a terminable trust; (3) a conditional fee; (4) the grant of the
exclusive privilege of use for the designated purposes,i.e., an easement in gross; (5) a lease. A brief discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the above
methods follows. In this discussion it is assumed the donor
desires the donee to have the full and complete use of the
premises for the specified purposes and that the donor
desires to retaini some alienable interest in the premises by
which he, his heirs or his assigns may regain ownership if
the specified use be abandoned by the donee.
(1) The Determinable Fee. The example of determinable fee given by Gray is an estate to A and his heirs until
they cease to be tenants of the Manor of Dale, or one
might substitute "so long as they continue to be tenants of
the Manor of Dale"? The language in which the terminating event is expressed is not material if the meaning is
clear, but the estate must be granted with the language
expressing the termination a part of the grant, instead of
being expressed as a condition following the granting language. In the principal case if this method were adopted
the grant should be made to the grantee and assigns until
they cease to use said land exclusively for school purposes,
or so long as they continue to use said land exclusively for
school purposes.
Gray insists that the determinable fee could not be
created after the passage of the Statute of Quia Emptores.8
GRAY, RuLe AGAINST PE PEITIES,
GRAY. RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITE,
§1300-302.
S

§18.

§81,

774-788; KALES,
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Other writers have disagreed with his conclusion,9 and in
some jurisdictions in this country the courts have upheld
estates which if not determinable fees are indistinguishable from them, usually in cases where the grant has been
for some public or quasi public purpose. 10 Since there seems
to be no decision upholding such an estate in West Virginia,
there is doubt whether the use of this method would do
more than give to the grantee an absolute fee in the land."
Assuming a determinable fee valid in this state what
would be the result? After the conveyance the grantee
would have an estate which will terminate ipso facto, if the
exclusive use for school purposes ceases, and the grantor
would have a possibility of reverter. The estate of the
grantee, if made to terminate when the exclusive use for
school purposes ceased, would be disadvantageous because
any partial use for other than such purposes might be held
to terminate the estate and, of course drilling for oil and
gas should terminate it. If the word "exclusive" were
omitted from the grant then it is probable the estate would
terminate only on complete abandonment of the specified
use and presumably the grantee could mine minerals on
the land so long as the use for school purposes continued.
This undesirable feature, so far as the grantee's estate is
concerned, could be corrected by a grant "until the grantee
and its assigns cease to use for school purposes" followed
by a covenant restricting the use of the land to school purposes exclusively. Then if the grantee should attempt to
open mines it could be restrained by the enforcement of
the covenant, but its estate would terminate only on complete abandonment of the specified use. If the grantee's
estate were made to terminate when it ceases to be used
I The whole controversy is set out in GaAY, RULn AcAINST PERPETUrTxaS, §§774-788.
There are dicta to the effect there may he a possibility of reverter in Carney v. Kain,
40 W. Va. 758, 812, 816, 23 S. E. 650(1895), and in Boling v. Petersburg, 8 Leigh
(Va.) 224, 234 (1837).
10 In some states there Are statutes providing fosi the dedication of land to the
public and under these statutes a fee simple passes to the municipality or other public
body, yet admittedly some sort of an interest remains in the dedicator. Kales prefers
to treat this interest as being similar to a right of entry for condition broken, because
of doubt as to the validity of the possibility of reverter. See KALX., FuTuiw INTERSTs,
H284-285. A gift of land to a municipality for a charitable purpose bears an analogy
to such a dedication. Under some dedication statutes the dedication may be made for
school purposes. See 18 C. J. 49. But in many cases a possibility of reverter has been
enforced. See 18 C. J. 301-302, 370-372.
At According to Gray's argument an attempt to create a determinable fee would
result In the creation of an absolute fee in the grantee. Gary, RULa AoAMST PEPzruzsm, 181.
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exclusively for school purposes, then a restrictive covenant
would seem useless for the event which would violate the
covenant, would also terminate the estate.
After the conveyance the grantor would have a possibility
of reverter,-an interest .which at common 'law is not
obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities, 12 which is inheritable 3 but inalienable14 so that if the grantor aliened
all his near-by lands, and. after a long period the use were
abandoned the title would then be in the heirs of the grantor whoever they might be. The possibility of reverter
could easily be held alienable as an "interest" in land under
statutes of this state.1 5
The determinable fee would not be an advantageous
method to use for, if its validity were not questionable
though, it could be so combined with a restrictive covenant
as to be entirely fair and satisfactory from the grantee's
side, the interest of the grantor would probably be inalienable and we have assumed the grantor desires to retain an
a: ienable interest.
(2) Terminable Charitable Trust. Suppose the land
were conveyed to trustees in trust for use for school purposes by a certain township or district exclusively, then in
case the use were abandoned the interest of the cestui
would terminate. In such a case the authorities hold there
is a resulting trust in favor of the grantor and his heirs or
devisees-an interest which is regarded as vested and therefore not within the rule against perpetuities." Having a
vested interest in the land subject to the trust, the grantor
may alienate his estate freely. The cestui would get the
use of the property and if that use were violated by mining
for minerals, equity, at the request of the one owning the
grantor's interest, would enforce the limitations of the
trust. A restrictive covenant added here would be needless, so far as the grantor is concerned, for the remedy for
enforcing the trust would be as effective as that on the
13 GRAY. Ruw AojisT PEzMTUTTS, §140, 41a.
P TnAwY. REAL PFSoPETY 474; KALES. FuTnU
INT STs,
1800.
it GRAY, RULE AGANsT PEIPZTUInn,
§14; TW7ANY. RrAL PZOml'r 474, and 10

Co'- L. Rsv. 84.

n "Any interest In or claim to real estate may be disposed of by deed or ill."
W. VA. CODE, ch. 71, §5. For a dictum to the effect a possibility of reverter Is not
alienable see Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 196, 85 S. V. 170 (1916).
10 See cases collected in GiAy, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITM,, §6031; 11 C. J. 872.
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restrictive covenant, in so far as the grantor is concerned.
Nevertheless such covenant might be of benefit to others.
For example, if part of the adjoining lands owned by the
grantor at the time of the creation of the trust were subsequently alienated by him, the owners of such lands probably could enforce a restrictive covenant made for the benefit of their lands, in case of a violation of the trust provided
the owner of the land subject to the trust should refus6 to
enforce the trust.
The objection to the terminable trust is that while the
authorities seem to support it so far as they go, the number
of cases is small and for that reason the court in this state
might possibly not feel bound to follow them.' But if there
were complete abandonment of the use, a total failure of
the purpose, it is difficult to see how the cy pres doctrine
could apply, and if so, certainly the property ought to revert to the donor and his heirs. Aside from this possible
objection this method is certainly an advantageous one. If
the trust were for school purposes with a covenant restricting the use solely to such purposes, then the cestui
would get the full and complete use of the premises for
such purposes. If such uses were abandoned the full
interest would go to the grantor or his heirs or his assigns,
as the case may be, by virtue of the resulting trust. Whoever owns this interest can compel the cestui to respect the
limitations of the trust and in case of a violation by mining
on the land, may have an effective remedy in equity. The
remedy on the restrictive covenant should be available to
owners of adjoining lands who hold under the grantor, if
made for the benefit of such lands, and they should be able
to enforce such covenant in case the owner of the land subject to the trust refused to do so. On the whole, this would
be one of the very best methods our law offers to accomplish the grantor's intent, provided the court would recognize and enforce the resulting trust. Probably the-court under the circumstances would enforce the trust. It is at least
IT Seemingly the court In Virginia has declared there is no such thing as a resulting
trust with respect to a charitable gift. See Clark V. Oliver, 91 Va. 421, 22 S. E.
175 (1895). No decisions have been found in this state but there is a dictum to the
effect that on total failure of the charitable purpose the property reverts to the donor
and his heirs. See Veneble v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. 310 (1867). Where the cy pres
doctrine may be applied there could be no such result but it is assumed this doctrine
would not apply in the situations under discussion.
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as certain of enforcement as the other methods herein
discussed.
(3) Conditional Fee Simple. 18 So far as the authorities go there is no doubt as to the validity of a condition
subsequent attached to a fee.19 Consequently an estate may
be granted in fee on condition that if the grantee or its
assigns cease to use the land exclusively for school purposes, the estate shall thereupon be forfeited and the grantor or his heir may enter. The exact language is not material
so long as the condition plainly appears, but the usual
grant is made "on condition that" or "provided that" followed by the words expressing the nature of the condition. 20
So far as the usual and ordinary meaning of the language
used is concerned, the intent of the grantor in the determinable fee and in the conditional fee seems the same, the distinction between the two being merely the technical one of
the form in which the event on which the estate is to end is
expressed. Thus a grant to the "township in fee so long as
used for school purposes" creates a determinable fee whilQ
a grant "to the township and its assigns for school purposes
provided that if the use for school purposes ceases the estate
of the grantee shall terminate" creates a conditional fee.
The legal effect of the two is very different. After granting
the conditional fee there is in the grantee a fee simple
estate subject to the condition. If the condition is violated
the estate does not terminate ipso facto as in case of the determinable fee, but remains until the person having the right
of entry for condition broken declares a forfeiture.2 1 If
no forfeiture is declared the estate remains in the grantee
in fee. The interest which remains in the grantor is a right
of entry for condition broken which interest is not obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. Like the possibility of
reverter at common law the right of entry is heritable but

'SThis term is used in this article to denote a fee simple estate on condition
sulsequent and is not intended to refer to the fee simple conditional as it existed before
the Statute of De Donis.
2. See TaTANy, REAL PaOPERTY 268; 18 C. J. 870-1; KALEs, FUTRn INTMEST9,
§216.
2 KALEs, FUun INTERESTS. §240.
GRAY, RULa AGAINST PEpRETuTms,

1§804-810; 1Ktmxs, FuruR INTERSTS, §662.
Courte frequently confuse possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition
broken.
'
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inalienable, 22 and it has even been held that an attempt to
alienate the right of entry destroys the condition leaving
an absolute fee in the grantee.2 On breach the grantor
must declare a forfeiture 2 and he may by his acts and his
laches quite easily waive his right to forfeit for a breach
of the condition so that he cannot thereafter exercise it.
It has been held that a condition attached to a fee may
be construed as a restrictive covenant and enforced as
such. 25 Query whether the same language may be enforced
as a restrictive covenant and later, on a new breach be
enforced as a condition as well. Probably if the estate
were conditioned on the exclusive use for school purposes
a court would refuse to enforce a forfeiture where the use
was still continued and an additional unauthorized use such
as opening a mine was made by the grantee. Courts have
always shown great reluctance to aid the enforcement of
a forfeiture of a fee. Yet if the use for school purposes
were abandoned there seems no reason why the court
would not enforce the forfeiture in such a case. 26 If so, the
best way to word the conveyance would be to make the
grant on condition the grantee continue to use the land for
school purposes, with a restrictive covenant that the grantee
use exclusively for such purposes. This would permit the
grantor or those who have taken any lands through him
which are benefittec by the covenant to enforce such covenant if there were an unauthorized use, while in case of
total abandonment of the use the grantor would take advantage of his condition and declare the estate forfeited.
In conclusion one might say that a grant on condition the
grantee continue to use the land for school purposes with
a restrictive covenant that said grantee use exclusively for
school purposes would be much better than a determinable
fee, because the validity of the conditional fee is established
while there is doubt as to validity of the determinRE KALES, FUTURE INTERESTs, §240. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPErurrIS, §12; TIFFANY,
HeAL PROPRTY 818. Some cases hold the interest is devisable and perhaps under modern
statutes It may come to be fully alienable. See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 815; 18 0. J.
866. Like the possibility of reverter it could be held to be aienable under the W. VA.

CODE c. 71, §5.
n TIFFANY. REA PRoPERTY 316. See cases collected in note 88 A. L. R. 111i.
m TIFFANY. RHAL PROPERTY 805-307.
Clark, "Equitable Servitudes," 16 MIcn. L. Rcv. 90, Q4.
Courts seem quite willing to aid in the enforcement of the forfeiture in such
cases as this. See cases cited. N. 46 post.
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able fee. Yet the right of entry has not the quality of
alienability, 27 and for this reason the terminable trust would
seem preferable to either the determinable fee or the con28
ditional fee.
(4) Easement in Gross. There seems no good reason
why the grantor instead of granting in fee may not convey
to the grantee just what he intends the grantee to have,
namely the exclusive privilege of use of the land for school
purposes. 2 This would amount to the conveyance of the
privilege of use in fee simple and would confer on the
grantee an interest similar to that which railroads often
obtain through eminent domain proceedings or that of the
public in roads and streets. The interest of the grantee
would be as useful for the purposes expressed as if it were
a fee,30 yet thd ownership of the land would remain in the
grantor subject to the servitude. No question as to the rule
against perpetuities could arise here, for the grantor would
have a substantial legal estate in the land as freely alienable as other legal estates in land. The grantee would acquire no title whatever to minerals beneath the land, except
in so far as they might be necessary for the support of the
surface. If the grantee should violate the easement the
owner of the land would have such legal and equitable
remedies as the law allows for such violation. He could
sue at law for damages3 1 or if the violation or threatened
violation were continuous he could secure the aid of the
equity court to restrain interference with his property
rights.82 A restrictive covenant would be of no value to
him since his remedies would already be adequate both at
law and in equity.
21 Unless it were held alienable under oh. 71. 95 of the W. VA. Conn a was suggested
supra, n. 22.
n A gift of land on condition that It be used solely for school purposes may be
construed as a trust, and in England Is so construed as a general rule, thup dolng
away with the conditional fee. GRAY, RuLz AoAINST PERPETUITME, §299. In thin caso
if construed as a trust it would create a terminable trust.
" This has been little used in the case of gifts for public or charitable purposea
but there is no good reason why it should not be used. It gives to the grantee a legal
eslate with exclusive possession of the land, and at the same time leaves the title In the
granter subject to the servitude. Both parties could protect their rights by use of the
usual legal and equitable remedies applicable to easements. For cases see R1oanoke
Investment Co. v. Railroad Co., 108 Mo. 50, 170 S. W. 1000 (1891) ; Right of Way Oil
Co. v. Oil & Gas Co.. 101 Tex. 94. 157 S. W. 787 (1913).
30 Neither the railroad nor the municipality is troubled In the use of the right of
wsy because such right of way Is legally only a servitude.

TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY 1358.
= TFANY, REAL PROPERTY 1360-62; Hershman v. Stafford, 58 W. Vs. 459, 52 S. 11

531 (1905) ; Rogerson v. Sheperd, 33 W. Va. 807, 10 S. E. 632 (1889) ; Russell v. Napler,
80 Ga. 7, 4 S. E. 857 (1887).
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Suppose the grantee should abandon the use? The interest being merely an easement may be lost by voluntary
abandonment3 3 so in such case the grantor could safely
enter and take possession if the intent to abandon were
clear, and the easement would thereby terminate. The
easement however, would constitute a cloud on the grantor's
title until he filed a bill and had the cloud removed. But
this objection is no greater than can be made in case of the
terminable trust, the determinable fee or the conditional
fee. In each case an action would almost certainly be required either to gain possession of the land or to remove
cloud from the title.34
An objection to the use of the easement in gross would
be the doubt as to the attitude of the court concerning it.
Some jurisdictions have held an easement in gross is neither
assignable nor inheritable. 5 If this were the law then the
grantee's estate might be non-assignable. But in the case
of exclusive rights of way courts have protected the interest
of the owner of the easement in gross by holding such interest is assignable,3 6 and it would seem very improbable
that our court would refuse to hold the interest of the
grantee assignable where the exclusive use was for public
benefit or for a charitable purpose.3 7 At all events the objection would not concern the grantor. His interest in the
land would be alienable and he would have adequate
remedies against the grantee in case his intent was not
respected.38
(5) The Lease. Though leases in fee simple, as they
n TIPANY. REAL PaopendTy 1377-81; Warren v. Stone, 7 W. Va. 474 (1874) ; Scott v.
Moore, 98 Va. 668, 37 S. B. 342 (1900). Likewise a profit may be lost by abandonment,
the doctrine having frequently been applied to oil and gas leases. See Parish Fork Oil
Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902) ; Steelsmith a. Cartlin,
45 W. Va. 27. 29 S. E. 978 (1898).
11 The record title would show a defect even if possession could be had without
action and a bill to remove a cloud from the title would be necessary.
" Hall v. Armstrong, 63 Conn. 554, 4 Atl. 113 (1886); Boatman v. Lasley, 28
Oh. St. 614 (1878) ; TIFFANY, REAL PaoPERTY 1226.
n Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, 72 N. J. EQ. 462, 66 AtL 427 (1907) ; See Goodrich v.
Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 456 (1866).
37 Whatever may be said in favor of the doctrine that an easement in gross is
personal only and not alienable nor inheritable as applied to the usual types of ease.
ments, such doctrine ought to have no application to those easements in grosi which
give to the owner exclusive possession of the surface of the land such as rights of way
for railroads, for public roads and streets and burial rights. This would be the character of the easement under discussion. Though it may be termed an easement in gross
it Is in fact as substantial an interest in the land as is acquired by very many lessees
under their leases. The distinction between such an easement and a lease is largely
one of legal theory rather than of practical fact.
3 An action at law or remedy in equity by injunction. See TnAFNY, RBw PaOtury 1370.
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are called, are not unknown to our law, yet usually some
sort of reversionary interest in the landlord is required in
order to have tenure between the parties.30 But the practical effect desired may be had by making a lease for a very
long term such as a thousand years or more.4 0 No reservation of rent is essential. The lease may be on condition that
if the use for school purposes be abandoned the landlord
or his assigns may forfeit the leasehold, or it may be made
for so long as the lessee and assigns continue to use the land
for school purposes not exceeding a thousand years, thus
creating a provision terminating the lease on abandonment
of the use. Any experienced lawyer can see how effectively
the lessor can proceed by proper covenants and conditions
to carry out his intent. The remedies for enforcement of
the various restrictive covenants and conditions would be
adequate. 41 Furthermore there seems no reason why a restrictive covenant for the benefit of adjoining lands then
owned by the lessor might not be inserted in the lease just
as well as in a grant in fee simple. 42 There could be no
question but that the lessor's reversion is freely alienable
and the assignee could enforce not only the covenants of
the lease but also the conditions.43 If at the same time there
were a restrictive covenant limiting the use for the benefit
of adjoining lands owned by the lessor, it would seem the
various remedies would be more complete and effective
than in any of the other methods. But it would be dangerous to make the lease in fee simple even on condition the
land was to be used only for school purposes, for the court
might well hold no relation of landlord arose but there was
granted a conditional fee4 4 or a determinable fee as the
case might be.
Conclusion. We have seen that a grant in fee simple
so long as the land continues to be used for a public or
charitable purpose at common law created a determinable
TIFFANY. LANDLORD & TENANT, §11; 85 C. J. 952.
There is no common law restriction on the length of the term.

any number of years.
"
'2

It may be for

See BLACxSTONE COMm. 142; POLLOCx & MAITLAND, HISTORY 0

THE ENGLISH LAW 112; Morrison v. Railroad Co., 63 Minn. '5.

65 X.

W. 141

(1895).

Remedies of a landlord against his tenant would be available.
There seems no reason why equity should not enforce a restrictive covenant In a

long term lease, if made for the benefit of adjoining lands.

m W. VA. CODE, oh. 93 §1. This has been quite generally true since the Statute of
82 Hen. VIII (1541).
44 See 28 C. J. 843. Leases in fee reserving ground rent are usually construed an
creating conditional fees.
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fee; a grant in fee simple on condition the land was to be
used only for specified public or charitable purposes with
a right of reentry on breach of the condition at common
law created a conditional fee; yet the intent of the grantor
seems exactly the same in both cases, the distinction being
merely in the form of the language used. An examination
of the authorities indicates that one or the other of these
forms of conveyance are usually used in such cases, probably with little knowledge of the probable consequences.
It seems evident that the courts do not understand the distinctions between the two types of estates, 45 and furthermore the courts seem to see no reason why a grantor should
not be permitted to make such a conveyance, nor why, on
proof of abandonment of the specified use, the grantor or
his heirs or his assigns as the case may be, should not be
able to get back the property, particularly where the intent
that it revert is clearly expressed in the conveyance. 46 The
possibility of reverter and the right of entry for condition
broken thus are apt to be confused by the courts 4 7- but
it seems clear that the courts are determined to allow the
grantor or his heirs or his assigns to recover the property
after abandonment of the use. It is probable that the old
common law distinction between the two estates will disappear, and that the interest of the grantor will come to
be everywhere alienable as well as inheritable, as has
already happened in some jurisdictions.
But it may be objected that if the possibility of reverter
and the right of entry for condition broken be made alienable, then they ought to be held void as being within the
rule against perpetuities unless properly limited to comply
with said rule. Professor Gray insisted that the latter of
these interests ought to be within the rule but admitted
-

Stewart u. Bain, 159 S. W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) ; McBride r. Farmers' &

Merchants' Gin Co., 152 S. W. 11351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) ; See Aumiller v. Dash, 51
Wash. 520, 99 Pac. 583 (1909) ; Brill v. Lynn, 207 Ky. '757, 270 S. W. 20 (1925).
"As to conditional fees see Los Angeles etc. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac.
596 (1919) ; Sherman v. Town of Jefferson, 274 Ill. 294. 113 N. E. 624 (1916) ; IndianFay v. Locke, 201 Mass. 387, 87
apolis etc. R. R. Co. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 580 (1879)
N. E. 763 (1909) ; Estes v. Muskegon etc. Ass'n., 181 Mich. 71, 147 N. W. 633 (1914) ;
Oxford Board of Trade v. Steel Co., 81 N. J. L. 694, 80 AtL 324 (1911) ; Richardson v.
Chdtfield, 86 Okla. 7100. 129 Pac. 728 (1913).
As to determinable fees see Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 885 (1868) ; McBride
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Gin Co., 152 S. W. 1135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
11 See cases n. 44 supra. See also note in 38 A. L. R. 1111 where the right of
entry for condition broken is called a possibility of reverter.
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that the law was settled otherwise. 48 Seemingly even where
a court has held some such interest alienable the question
whether it ought for this reason be within the rule against
perpetuities has not been raised. If the question were
argued, it is probable the courts would nevertheless hold
the interestJ was not within the rule where the gift was for
some public or charitable purpose. In such case the reasons given by Professor Gray why it is reasonable that the
rule apply to contingent future interests which are alienable
would not seem to apply here since the interest of the
grantor would be of little value and the grantee is not supposed to have the power to alienate except for the purpose
of carrying out the public or charitable use to which the
49
land is devoted.
In England the conditional fee has become obsolete because the courts have construed such conveyances as creating trusts 0 and one would have to go only a little further
to put the same construction on the determinable fee. The
trust, when the conveyance is so construed, would seem to
be a terminable trust of the sort discussed above, and this
form of trust forms a very satisfactory method of making
a grant such as we are discussing. But the intent of the
grantor to create a trust is none too clear, and one could
just as easily recognize and enforce the possibility of reverter and the right of entry for condition broken, the only
change necessary being to hold both interests alienable,
which would be easy under most modern statutes. The
long term lease would form a most excellent method of
carrying out the desired purpose, but it is unlikely the
average lawyer would venture to use it, or that the beneficiaries would be pleased with such an interest, though it
could be made just as desirable from the standpoint of the
charity as either the determinable fee, the conditional fee
or the terminable trust.
While in this state where the courts have seemingly not
yet dealt with the determinable fee or the conditional fee,
the use of the terminable trust, the long term lease or the
easement in gross might be advised as being preferable
GY,

R ULm AGAINST PEPETUMiES,

§§804, 805.

GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. §268.
- GRAY, RULE AGAiNST PEBPETUITIES, §299.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss4/2

14

Simonton: Methods of Making Gifts for Charitable or Public Uses
METHODS OF MAKING GIFTS OF LJND

from the grantor's standpoint, yet it is more than probable
that the two former methods will be used as a matter of
course, partly because they seem to express the grantor's
intention, even though their legal effect may not be in accordance with such intention. The legal effect must be
left to the courts when questions arise, but it must be admitted there is considerable uncertainty as to the outcome,
and it must be remembered that if the decision of the court
as to either estate is adverse to the grantor he is apt to
lose all interest in the land, while if the easement in gross
or the lease were used the grantor's interest would be safe
enough, 51 and there would be a natural tendency on the
part of the courts to uphold a charitable gift in favor of the
grantee. An adverse decision in case of the terminable
trust might destroy the grantor's interest yet this sort of
trust is better established than is the determinable fee and
perhaps as well established as the conditional fee.
" If held defective for any reason the grantor would be benefited though his
itent might wholly or partially fail.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

15

